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ABSTRACT
The author offers a brief report of introducing the study of religion in India since 1947. While 
doing so he refers to the Constitution of India, so -called Nehruvian Consensus, the Kothari 
Commission which made an important distinction between ‘religious education’ and ‘educa-
tion about religion’, as well as several other bodies responsible for national policy on education, 
which gave a unique shape of Indian secularism.
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PART I
One would imagine that it would not be difficult to make a case for the study of 
religion in a multireligious country like India. The presence of many religions 
in the country would presumably predispose one to the acceptance of the idea. 
Such, however, is not the case. India began its life as an independent country 
in 1947 with a staunch commitment to secularism, a secularism which did not 
look upon the role of religion in public life with favour. This could well be on 
account of the fact that the independence of India was accompanied by its parti-
tion, on religious grounds, into India and Pakistan, which was accompanied by 
much blood -letting. Religion therefore came to be viewed in negative terms by 
the intelligentsia. Moreover, the Indian National Congress, which led the move-
ment for Indian independence, had long opposed partition but accepted it as the 
price to be paid for independence. It had to justify this change in its stance to the 
Indian people, which it did by arguing that the division of the country into India 
and Pakistan was not a division between a Hindu India and a Muslim Pakistan (as 
Pakistan maintained), but a division between a secular India and a theocratic Pa-
kistan. Secularism thus became a part of the founding myth of the Indian nation.
It was then enshrined in the Indian constitution, when it was adopted in 
1950, in the following way so far instruction in religion was concerned:
Article 28 (1): No religious instruction shall be provided in any educational institution 
wholly maintained out of State funds.
 (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to an educational institution which is admin-
istered by the State but has been established under any endowment or trust which 
required that religious instruction shall be imparted in such institution.
 (3) No person attending any educational institution recognized by the State or re-
ceiving aid out of State funds shall be required to take part in any religion instruction 
that may be imparted in such institution or to attend any religious worship that may be 
conducted in such institution or in any premises attached thereto unless such person 
or, if such person is a minor, his guardian has given consent to (Sen, 2010: 105, n. 1).
This understanding of secularism as excluding the teaching of religion was 
an element in what is called the Nehruvian Consensus, which constituted the 
intellectual legacy of Nehru and was embraced by the Indian intelligentsia in 
general, along with socialism and democracy.
PART II
There was, however, another stream of opinion from the time of independ-
ence onwards which was inclined to consider the non -confessional teaching of 
religion as fully consistent with the idea of secularism.
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An early exponent of this view was Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the educa-
tion minister in the government of India. As early as January 1948 he expressed 
the view the government should promote the study of religion, because ‘India’s 
difficulties, unlike those of Europe and America, were not due to materialism 
and rationalism but rather to religious fanaticism’ (Smith, 1963: 348). Such 
fanaticism, however, could not be curbed if religious education was left in pri-
vate hands, as for private teachers ‘religion means nothing but bigotry’ (Smith, 
1963: 348). He therefore concluded his address to the Central Advisory Board 
of Education in the following words:
If we want to safeguard the intellectual life of our country against this danger, it be-
comes all the more necessary for us not to leave the imparting of early religious educa-
tion to private sources. We should rather take it under our direct care and supervision. 
No doubt, a foreign government had to keep itself away from religious education. But 
a national government cannot divest itself of undertaking this responsibility (Smith, 
1963: 348–349).
The proposal however was turned down by Prime Minister Nehru and also 
by the Constituent Assembly as indicated by Article 28 of the Constitution.
PART III
Voices in favour of introducing religious education in the curriculum continued 
to be raised after the promulgation of the Constitution by people like John 
Matthai, S.R. Das, C. Rajgopalachari, Rukmini Devi Arundale and Dr. Sam-
purnanand (Smith, 1963: 349–350) but found formal expression in The Report 
of the University Education Commission of 1950. The commission was chaired 
by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan.
It is interesting to consider, by way of background, the reasons adduced 
for keeping the study of the religion out of the educational system from 
a purely educational point of view. This reason is expressed well in the report 
of the Education Commission of 1882 which observed that: ‘The declared 
neutrality of the State forbids its connecting the institutions directly main-
tained by it with any one form of faith; and the other alternative of giving 
equal facilities in such institutions for the inculcation of all forms of faith 
involves practical difficulties which we believe to be insuperable’ (Mahade-
van, 1971: 282).
The shift in the perspective brought about by independence is reflected 
in the following words of the Radhakrishnan Report, so to say: ‘India is the 
meeting place of the great religions of the world and will play an increasingly 
prominent role in the religious life of mankind and Indian students should 
have an idea of India’s role in the world’ (Mahadevan, 1971: 283).
24 Arvind SHARMA
The contents of the report could be considered from both a theoretical and 
a practical point of view. On the theoretical side its conclusions could be re-
duced to the following four formulations:
(1) Dogmatic religion leads to conflict; (2) religious conflict leads to a secular state; 
(3) the secular state bans only dogmatic religious instruction in state schools; (4) the 
state can and should provide for the teaching of universal religion (Smith, 1963: 351).
On the practical side it made the following concrete recommendations.
(1) that all educational institutions start work with a few minutes for silent meditation;
(2) that in the first year of the Degree course lives of the great religious leaders like 
Gautama the Buddha, Confucius, Zoroaster, Socrates, Jesus, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, 
Madhva, Mohammad, Kabīr, Nānak, Gāndhi, be taught;
(3) that in the second year some selections of a universalist character from the scrip-
tures of the world be studied;
(4) that in the third year, the central problems of the philosophy of religion be con-
sidered (Mahadevan, 1971: 283).
The next commission to address this issue was what came to be called 
the Kothari Commission, an education commission (1964–1966) which was 
chaired by Dr. K.S. Kothari. The Kothari Commission made an important 
distinction between ‘religious education’ and ‘education about religion’, and 
explained the distinction as follows:
The former is largely concerned with the teaching of the tenets and practices of 
a particular religion, generally in the form in which the religious group envisages 
them, whereas the latter is a study of religions and religious thought from a broad 
point of view — the eternal quest of the spirit. […]. It makes the point that it is 
necessary for a multi -religious democratic State to promote a tolerant study of reli-
gions so that its citizens can understand each other better and live amicably together 
(Sen, 2010: 93).
We have so far pursued the matter largely from an educational perspective. 
The matter, however, took a legal turn in 2002 and we shall devote the next 
section to exploring this dimension of the issue.
PART IV
It was argued before the supreme court in 1971, in the case DAV College v. Pun-
jab that the provision for teaching the philosophy of Guru Nanak infringed 
upon article 28, namely, that ‘no religious instruction shall be provided in any 
educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds’ (Sen, 2010: 93). 
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In pronouncing its judgement, the Court made a distinction between religious 
instruction and the study of religions as follows: ‘To provide for academic 
study of life and teaching or the philosophy and culture of any great saint of 
India in relation to or the impact on Indian and world civilizations cannot be 
considered as making provision for religious instruction’ (Sen, 2010: 91). In 
other words, the Court was outlining a distinction between the confessional 
and the non -confessional or academic study of religion.
The situation got clarified further in the Aruna Roy v. Union of India case of 
2002. The National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) 
is a well -known governmental body associated with formulating national policy 
on education. When the Hindu nationalist party known as the Bharatiya Ja-
nata Party (BJP) was heading a coalition government at the centre, it came 
up with a National Curriculum Framework for School Education (NCFSE) 
in 2000, which asserted the need for ‘not religious education but education 
about religions, their basics, the values inherent therein and also a comparative 
study of the philosophy of all religions’ (Sen, 2010: 90). The NCFSE propos-
al emphasized that ‘education about religions must be handled with extreme 
care […] All religions therefore have to be treated with equal respect (Sarva 
Dharma Sambhav) and there should be no discrimination on the ground of any 
religion (panthanirapekshata)’ (Sen, 2010: 90).
The Court rejected the contention that the suggestion of the NFSCE went 
against article 28 of the Indian constitution. Speaking for the court, M.B. 
Shah, J did so on three grounds. First, he alluded to the government commit-
tee reports which advocated value based education, including the S.B. Chavan 
committee which stated that religion is a ‘most misused and misunderstood 
concept’ and that ‘the basics of all religions, the values therein, and also a com-
parative study of the philosophy of all religions should begin at the middle 
stage in schools and continue up to the university level’ (Sen, 2010: 90–91). 
Next, he argued that the suggestion was consistent with article 51 -A of the 
constitution which declares it as one of the duties of every citizen to ‘promote 
harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of 
India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities’ 
(Sen, 2010: 91). Finally, he distinguished between religious instruction and 
the study of religion drawing on the DAV v. Punjab case.
The judgment in the Aruna Roy case was severely criticized by Martha 
Nassbaum, who declared that ‘justice Manharlal Bhikanlal Shah’s majority 
opinion is one of the weakest pieces of legal argumentation that has recently 
emerged from the Supreme Court of India’ (Sen, 2010: 92). Her two main 
criticisms of the judgment seem to be that (1) according to the court, religion 
is the ‘foundation for value based survival of human beings in a civilized so-
ciety’ (Nussbaum, 2008: 274). According to Nussbaum this represents a ‘slide 
from ethical values to religious values’ (Sen, 2010: 94). And further that (2) the 
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study of religion was connected in the judgment with the destiny of the nation 
as in the following words:
[…] the lives of the Indian people have been enriched by integration of various reli-
gions and that is the strength of this nation. Whatever kind of people come to India 
either for shelter or as aggressors, India has tried to accept the best part of their reli-
gions. As a result a composite culture gradually developed in India and enriched the 
lives of Indians (Sen, 2010: 94).
This statement was made by Dharmadhikari in his concurring judgment. 
These arguments possess force. The academic study of religion is academic — 
it is not meant to be didactic or syncretic. The points can, however, be refined 
in such a way as to be consistent with the academic study of religion by argu-
ing that these need not be the i ntended  results of the study although they 
are f o r e s e e ab l e  results. Similarly, one could identify two sources of value 
formation in the modern world — the liberal secular tradition and the reli-
gions of the world. Instead of conflating the two, one could see the latter as 
reinforcing the former. Similarly, one could see the study of religion as fore-
seeably strengthening the spiritual dimension of life, as distinguished from the 
religious dimension of life. It is quite clear therefore that the study of religion 
has been deemed both educationally desirable and legally permissible. All that 
remains to be done is to introduce it.
In the next few sections I would like to examine some issues arising out of 
the previous discussion: (1) in arguing for the study of religion, to what extent 
have arguments been made which have parallels in the West and to what extent 
are they unique to India; (2) what typically Indian contour or colour the study 
of religion might acquire when pursued in India and (3) what implication will 
its introduction have for India secularism, especially as it was Indian secularism 
of a particular brand which opposed its introduction in the first place.
PART V
A particular kind of distinction has been persistently invoked, sometimes in 
slightly different guises, when the case for the study of religion has been made 
in India both outside and within the court. Sometimes it takes the form of 
a distinction between ‘religious instruction’ and ‘religious education’ (Sen, 
2010: 90), sometimes between ‘religious instruction’ and the ‘study of religion’ 
(Sen, 2010: 91) and sometimes between ‘religious education’ and ‘education 
about religions’ (Sen, 2010: 93). All these attempts at distinguishing between 
the terms involved seem like different attempts to articulate or formulate 
the same distinction. This is the distinction between religion as it is taught 
in a confessional setting, and religion as it is taught in a non -confessional 
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or academic setting. There is a clear resonance here of a similar distinction 
drawn in the West between ‘studying religion’ and ‘studying about religion’. 
The study of religion, when introduced in an academic setting in the U.SA, 
attracted the same charges as it does now in India. The case went to the courts 
and they made a distinction similar to the one in India. I do not know to 
what extent the Western experience was drawn upon during the discussions 
in India and its examination could constitute a fascinating study, for if it turns 
out that the Indian legal tradition came up with it on its own, then we would 
have a surprising, and perhaps interesting parallel on our hands. In any case, 
this particular argument has a clear Western resonance, if not a clear Western 
connection.1
Other arguments, however, seem to have an Indian flavour. The idea that 
one should engage in the study of religion to promote common brotherhood 
reflects a very Indian sentiment. I am not suggesting that people in the West 
may not have also thought that such study might promote common brother-
hood, but while it could be a f o r e s e e ab l e  consequence of such study, one 
wonders to what extent it might have been so i ntended  in the West, pace 
Max Müller (Müller, 1892: 29–60, esp. 60).
Another Indian feature is the distinction between dogma  and ph i l o s -
ophy  sometimes invoked in this context. Thus the Radhakrishnan Report 
states:
There is a difference between the preaching of dogma and a philosophical study of 
religion. While the former is precluded, the latter is permitted. There shall be no 
sectarian indoctrination in State institutions. But history of religion and of religious 
institutions, comparative religion, philosophy of religion can all be studied even in 
institutions maintained wholly out of State funds (Sen, 2010: 93).
A third Indian feature is provided by the invocation of the word dharma. 
This point comes out clearly in the concurring judgment of, Dharmadhikari, 
J in Aruna Roy v. Union of India. His position is summarized by Ronojoy Sen 
as follows:
1  The distinction was already drawn by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, who had studied in the 
U.K. and U.S.A. during the Constituent Assembly debates. He explained while discussing 
what was to become article 28: ‘It is therefore not proper to say that by this article we have 
altogether barred religious education. Religious instruction has been left to be taught and be 
given by each community according to its aims and objects subject to certain conditions. All 
that is barred is this, that the State in the institutions maintained by it wholly out of public 
funds, shall not be free to give religious instructions’. When asked whether the study of 
Hindu scriptures constituted religious instruction, he replied: ‘Religious instruction must be 
distinguished from research or study. T ho s e  a r e  t wo  d i f f e r e nt  t h i n g s. For instance, 
as far as Islam religion is concerned, it means that you believe in one god, that you believe that 
Pagambar the Prophet is the last Prophet and soon, in other words what is called “dogma”’ 
(Sen, 2010: 92, emphasis added).
28 Arvind SHARMA
In a concurring judgment, Dharmadhikari, J said, ‘The academic study of the teaching 
and the philosophy of any great saint such as Kabir, Guru Nanak and Mahavir was held 
to be not prohibited by Article 28(1) of the Constitution’. He, however, admitted that 
there was a ‘very thin dividing line’ between imparting of religious education and study 
of religions. Dharmadhikari gets around this problem by positing that the Indian 
concept of dharma differs from religion as understood in the West. According to him, 
in the concept of dharma ‘different faiths, sects and schools of thoughts merely are 
different ways of knowing truth which is one’. This allows for the teaching of religious 
education, which would mean ‘approaching the many religions of the world with an 
attitude of understanding’. He stressed that this understanding of religion is essential 
for a multi -religious society such as India (Sen, 2010: 91).
PART VI
This leads up to the next point — how might the academic study of religion in 
India develop, as it evolves. It might be fair to say that it will remain linked in 
the Indian mind with the ideas of human brotherhood and religious universal-
ism, though not necessarily with the idea of a universal religion. These ideals 
may not affect the actual study of religion but will continue to constitute the 
affective side of the enterprise. Almost all discussions of it, both legal or other-
wise, seem to invoke this, though none does it so unambiguously as Mahatma 
Gandhi:
I hold that it is the duty of every cultured man or woman to read sympathetically the 
scriptures of the world. If we are to respect others’ religions as we would have them to 
respect our own, a friendly study of the world’s religions is a sacred duty. We need not 
dread, upon our grown up children, the influence of scriptures other than our own. We 
liberalize their outlook upon life by encouraging them to study freely all that is clean. 
Fear there would be when someone reads his own scriptures to young people with the 
intention secretly or openly of converting them. He must then be biased in favour of 
his own scriptures. For myself, I regard my study of and reverence for the Bible, the 
Qur’an, and the other scriptures to be wholly consistent with my claim to be a staunch 
Sanatani Hindu. He is no Sanatani Hindu who is narrow, bigoted and considers evil 
to be good if it has the sanction of antiquity and it to be found supported in any San-
skrit book. I claim to be a staunch Sanatani Hindu because, though I reject all that 
offends my moral sense, I find the Hindu scriptures to satisfy the needs of the soul. 
My respectful study of other religions has not abated my reverence for or my faith in 
the Hindu scriptures. They have indeed left their deep mark upon my understanding 
of the Hindu scriptures. They have broadened my view of life. They have enabled me 
to understand more clearly many an obscure passage in the Hindu scriptures (Gandhi, 
1958: 237).
Thus the study of religion, while serving a practical purpose, is likely to 
retain a somewhat idealistic orientation.
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PART VII
Ronojoy Sen observes perceptively, in relation to Indian secularism, that In-
dian secularism could be seen as ‘oscillating between sarvadharma samabhav 
and dharma nirpekshata’ (Sen, 2010: 94). The form of Indian secularism which 
associated it with sarvadharma samabhāva or equal respect of all religions, rep-
resents the Gandhian understanding of it. According to this understanding the 
state sees religion as playing a positive role in public life, while itself remain-
ing equidistant from particular religious traditions. Such an understanding of 
secularism inclines towards religious pluralism as a value and promotes it. The 
other understanding of Indian secularism is represented by the Sanskrit term 
dharma nirpekṣatā or religious neutrality. It represents the Nehruvian under-
standing of it, which would limit the role of religion in the public square in the 
interest of science and a modern polity.2
It could be argued that Aruna Roy judgment ‘consciously aims at the for-
mer’ (Sen, 2010: 94). Thus Dharmadhikari in his concurring judgment stated: 
‘The real meaning of secularism in the language of Gandhi is sarva dharma 
sambhav meaning equal treatment and respect of all religions, but we have 
misunderstood the meaning of religion as sarva dharma samabhav meaning the 
negation of all religions’ (Sen, 2010: 97). He goes on to cite Mahatma Gandhi 
to the effect that
[…] a curriculum of religious education should include a study of the tenets of faiths 
other than one’s own. For this purpose the student should be trained to cultivate the 
habit of understanding and appreciating the doctrines of various great religions of the 
world in a spirit of reverence and broadminded tolerance (Sen, 2010: 97).
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